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Abstract: 
 
The present research examined the effect of promotion decisions on ex-post productivity in 
French academia. As, once promotion decisions are known, most external incentives vanish 
for promoted candidates, their productivity was expected to decrease. This hypothesis was 
tested by using an original dataset and matching methods to evaluate the impact of 
promotion on publication scores. The robustness of the matching estimates was tested using 
sensitivity analysis. The results clearly show that the removal of extrinsic incentives following 
promotion does not lead to a fall in productivity in French academia. 
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I- Introduction 
 
The central role of promotions in organizations has been a major focus of the literature on 
careers. Promotions have two goals (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992). First, they aim to improve 
the organizations’ performance by assigning employees to the jobs that best suit their 
abilities. Second, they serve as incentives (see Gibbons and Waldman, 1999, and 
Prendergast, 1999, for a survey). The tournament model (Lazear and Rosen, 1981) 
illustrates this second role well. Imagine a firm in which all the workers initially have the 
same low-ability-level job for which they all receive the same wage. Able workers are then 
promoted to jobs that demand higher levels of ability and that are rewarded with higher 
wages. The greater the wage-difference between the two jobs, the greater the incentive to 
work hard. Promotions can also boost performance by providing incentives for higher 
human-capital investment (Carmichael, 1983; Prendergast, 1993) and by increasing job 
satisfaction (Francesconi, 2001). 
However, this conventional view of promotions is increasingly being called into question, as it 
is recognized that promotions can also have negative consequences (Baker et al., 1998).  
Numerous examples of reductions in productivity after promotion can be seen in the real 
world, including in universities. For example, the productivity of American university 
professors has been observed to decline after tenure is obtained (Lazear, 2004). In order to 
be promoted to full professor, assistant professors must publish more than the average; 
hence, the quest for tenure tends to boost productivity. However, this external, and thus 
extrinsic, incentive vanishes once tenure, which is generally not reversible, has been 
obtained. Conversely, assistant professors who are denied tenure must move to other 
universities and publish more. Finally, promotion decisions seem to strongly influence ex-
post effort. 
 
The present study tests whether or not productivity also decreases after being promoted (or 
not) in the French university system. The French and American systems are very different in 
that French professors are recruited as civil servants on permanent contracts. Therefore, in 
France, promotions are about obtaining higher pay and extra responsibilities, rather than 
gaining tenure. In addition, professors can be viewed as motivated workers, who are 
influenced more by intrinsic incentives than by extrinsic incentives (Besley and Ghatak, 
2005). Consequently, the impact of being promoted or not on effort may be different from 
what has been observed in the American system. Furthermore, France is currently 
experiencing a move towards greater evaluation of public-sector workers in all fields, 
including the university sector. As a result, the work of academics is coming under increasing 
scrutiny, in terms of both teaching and research, and the Ministry of Education is expected to 
introduce wide-ranging reforms in professors’ career structures and promotion procedures 
(see the Schwartz Report, 2008). However, the promotion system has never been properly 
evaluated – a situation the present study remedies.     
 
In order to carry out this evaluation, an original dataset of publication scores and promotions 
of university professors in the field of business studies was created. Because most 
promotions are awarded on the basis of a centralized promotion procedure, called the 
concours d’agrégation, the study focused on this procedure. The database contained 
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information about promotion decisions (and their explanatory factors), and could be used to 
evaluate candidates’ publication records before and after the promotion procedure. For the 
purposes of the present study, publications were divided into three categories: articles in 
international journals, articles in national journals, and books. The quality of each publication 
was also taken into account. 
 
A major problem facing all evaluations of this type is the impossibility of knowing how 
productive a person would have been if promotion had not been granted (Rubin, 1974). This 
difficulty was addressed by using matching methods to obtain unbiased evaluations of the 
impact of promotions (Heckman et al., 1997, 1998). Data from the growing literature on 
careers in academia was used to calculate propensity scores; that is to say, the probability of 
being promoted. Because empirical studies of the determinants of promotion have 
highlighted the effects of gender (Ginther and Hayes, 1999, 2003; Long et al., 1993), 
productivity (Mc Dowell et al., 2001) and networks (Combes et al., 2008), all these factors 
had to be included in order to obtain robust propensity scores. These propensity scores were 
then used to calculate counterfactual publication scores and to compare productivity before 
and after promotion. In addition, a sensitivity analysis was carried out to test the plausibility 
of the Conditional Independence Assumption that underlies all matching estimates (Ichino et 
al., 2008). 
 
The following section explores the impact of being promoted (or not) on ex-post productivity 
in the light of both extrinsic and intrinsic incentives, and examines possible ways of 
evaluating changes in productivity. Section 3 describes the dataset and Section 4 presents a 
discussion of the results of the matching estimates and of the sensitivity analysis. 
 
 
 
II- The effect of promotions on ex-post productivity 
 
Promotions, incentives and productivity 
 
Tournament models (Lazear and Rosen, 1981) and numerous related empirical studies have 
clearly demonstrated that the prospect of promotion encourages employees to make greater 
efforts in order to maximize their chances of promotion. However, this positive ex-ante 
impact often seems to be followed by a slight decrease in effort after promotion. The 
literature contains two explanations for this decrease: a) a reduction in incentives, b) the 
effect of unobserved abilities.  
Within the principal-agent framework, incentives are considered to influence a worker’s effort 
both before and after promotion (Prendergast, 1999). Therefore, firms must try to maintain 
strong incentives for workers throughout their careers, for example, by organizing dynamic 
tournaments (Meyer, 2002). However, these procedures have high direct costs, particularly 
in terms of organization time, leaving less time available for checking the worker’s effort. As 
a result, dynamic tournaments may increase uncertainty in the promotion procedure. Given 
these negative impacts, organizations may prefer to reward workers via a single promotion 
procedure. In this case, once promotion decisions are known, most external incentives 
vanish for promoted candidates. Therefore, the absence of future rewards may explain why 
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effort sometimes declines following promotion. Conversely, workers who are not promoted 
must increase their productivity if they are to be considered for promotion in the future.  
Lazear (2004) suggests a second explanation for this fall in productivity, maintaining that the 
decline starts whenever promotion is based on both permanent and transitory components 
of ability. Transitory components can distort assessments of workers’ true abilities, as it is 
often difficult to measure and differentiate between actual performance and strategic 
behaviors. In addition, it is not always easy to ascertain whether or not a candidate has the 
skills required by the higher position. Because firms have difficulty in distinguishing between 
permanent and transitory abilities, they tend to promote workers who have sufficient overall 
pre-promotion abilities. However, the expected value of the post-promotion transitory 
component is zero, leading to a reduction in the productivity of promoted workers.  
 
Finally, because workers clearly respond to positive external incentives before promotion and 
to the reduction in such incentives after promotion, the individual effort produced by 
promoted workers would be expected to decline (and the effort produced by non-promoted 
workers to increase). Barmby et al. (2006) confirmed the expected fall in post-promotion 
outputs in a large British financial firm. They concluded that two-thirds of this fall could be 
attributed to Lazear’s theory of decline (2004), and one-third to reduced incentives. 
 
This raises the question of whether or not such a decline in post-promotion productivity 
occurs in academia, given that both the above two explanations assume that a worker’s 
effort depends only on external incentives, that is, on extrinsic motivation. However, this 
hypothesis has been strongly contradicted by the psychology literature, which shows that the 
amount of effort produced by a worker depends on intrinsic motivation as well as on 
extrinsic motivation (Frey, 1997a). Intrinsic motivation is measured in terms of effort 
displayed in the absence of external rewards (Deci, 1975). As De Varo and Brookhire (2007) 
pointed out, intrinsic motivation depends on particular attributes of jobs or on the 
organization’s missions. For example, in nonprofit organizations that provide collective 
goods, such as the French education system, intrinsic motivation seems to play a more 
important role than extrinsic motivation. Professors can thus be considered motivated 
workers, or ‘agents who pursue goals because they perceive intrinsic benefits from doing so’ 
(Besley and Ghatak, 2005). In this context, motivated workers  are less influenced by 
financial incentives than in the private sector (De Varo, Brookshire, 2007; Narcy, 2009). This 
may be reinforced in French academia because professors are recruited as civil servants and 
immediately given long-term contracts. Consequently, promotion decisions will not change 
their job security. In addition, a crowding-out effect may occur (Frey, 1997b, Bénabou, 
Tirole, 2003), with rewards and punishments decreasing intrinsic motivation and leading to 
lower performance.  
Hence, viewing university professors as motivated workers suggests that they may be less 
sensitive to rewards than other workers. Therefore, the decline in professors’ productivity 
following promotion that is predicted by agency theory may be small or even zero. The 
present study was designed to test this hypothesis by examining the effect of promotion on 
ex-post productivity in French academia. 
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The evaluation framework 
 
In order to measure the impact of being promoted or not, it was first necessary to overcome 
the problem of how to evaluate performance differentials (Rubin, 1974). This problem can be 
presented as follows. Candidates for promotion are denoted i . Their personal attributes 
(age, gender, etc.) are defined in a vector, x . A binary variable, C , denotes whether a 
candidate was promoted to the senior professor rank (the treatment group, C  = 1) or not 
(the reference group, C  = 0).  
Candidates’ publication performances are evaluated via a single indicator, publication score, 
which is a measure of the number of journal articles and books a candidate has published 
(see Section 3 for more details and a discussion). Publication scores for candidates who are 
promoted and for candidates denied promotion are denoted 1P  and 0P , respectively. If there 
is no interference between units, potential outcomes depend on the treatment received, and 
not on what treatments other units receive. This assumption, named Stable Unit Treatment 
Value Assumption2 by Rubin (1986), allows to define 1P  and 0P  as mutually exclusive 
outcomes that cannot be observed simultaneously. The observed outcome is thus given by: 
( ) 01 1 PCCPP !+=       (1) 
The impact of promotion on a candidate’s publication score is the difference between the 
candidate’s observed publication score after promotion and the mean publication score the 
candidate would have obtained if promotion had been refused. This can be expressed as: 
( ) [ ] [ ]xXCPExXCPEx ==!=== ,1/,1/ 01"     (2) 
The second term defines the counterfactual publication score; that is to say, the hypothetical 
(and therefore unobservable) score successful candidates would have obtained if they had 
not been promoted.  
To estimate ( )xα , the counterfactual publication score must be calculated. A number of 
experimental and non-experimental methods are available to do this (see Heckman et al., 
1999; Brodaty et al., 2007). Because the present study was based on a non-experimental 
dataset consisting of publication scores and promotion data for business studies professors, 
a non-experimental method had to be used. The most widely used non-experimental method 
is based on matching estimators, which involves matching each successful candidate, i , with 
an unsuccessful candidate, i~ , with the same characteristics, x . As no two individuals are 
entirely similar in all observable attributes, the matching process was based on propensity 
scores; that is to say, on the probability of being promoted (treatment probability). This 
probability was estimated using a probit model. In line with McDowell et al. (2001) and 
Combes et al. (2008), the present study introduced past productivity scores and network 
variables as explanatory factors of success at the promotion procedure, taking into account 
both research quality and peer-rich effects. Individual attributes (gender and past career 
characteristics), and amount of competition (vacancy to candidate ratio) were also included 
(Ginther and Hayes, 1999, 2003; Long et al., 1993). Research department quality may also 
influence the probability of being promoted; however, no chronological data on departments’ 
members or their publications are available, so it was impossible to include information on 
                                                            
2 The SUTVA assumption is here assumed to be valid as publication scores of a given candidate do not depend on the fact that 
other candidates are promoted (or not).  
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research department quality in the dataset. Details of the available variables are described 
below. As matched individuals are considered to be identical, the publication scores of 
unsuccessful candidates were used to estimate the counterfactual scores of promoted 
candidates (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). To be efficient, this method must respect the 
Conditional Independence Assumption (CIA), that is, promotion must only depend on the 
observables (see Section 4 for a discussion). 
Of all the available matching methods (nearest-neighbor estimators, radius matching, kernel 
matching, etc.), kernel-matching methods applied to the evolution of outcomes (difference in 
difference)3 have been found to give the most robust estimates for ( )x!  in large samples 
(Heckman et al., 1997, 1998).  
 
The kernel-matching estimator is defined as: 
( ) ( )( )
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where 1!!=" tPPP , 1N  is the number of promoted candidates, K  is a kernel function with 
( )!
+"
"#
= 1duuK , and h  is a bandwidth function. 
Frölich (2004) demonstrated the finite-sample properties of kernel-matching estimators 
when the control (non-promoted) to treated (promoted) ratio is large, as was the case in the 
present sample (346 non-promoted and 280 promoted candidates). Hence, this method was 
used to evaluate the effect of being promotion decisions on the publication scores of both 
successful and unsuccessful candidates. A sensitivity analysis was also performed for the 
matching estimators and the plausibility of the Conditional Independence Assumption was 
tested. A positive result shows that pre-promotion variables can be used to efficiently match 
promoted and non-promoted professors. However, a negative result (Conditional 
Independence Assumption not plausible) indicates that promoted and non-promoted 
professors also differ according to unobservable attributes. As the data do not provide 
information on the distribution of 0P  for promoted professors, the CIA cannot be directly 
tested. Hence, Ichino et al.’s method (2008) was used to assess the robustness of matching 
estimators (see Section 4 for the results of the sensitivity analysis).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
3 This allows the elimination of unobservable individual effects.  
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III-  Data and method 
 
Promotions in the French university system 
 
French universities recognize two ranks of professor: maître de conferences (equivalent to 
assistant professor in the US university system) and professeur des universities (equivalent 
to full professor). The present study focused on the field of business studies. In this field 
(and in Economics, Law and Political Sciences4), promotion from assistant professor to full 
professor can be obtained either via a centralized procedure known as the concours 
d’agrégation, or via a decentralized procedure (mainly through local selection committees). 
These two promotion procedures are governed by very different rules.  
Two types of concours d’agrégation exist. The first concours is an external competition and 
is open to anybody with a Ph.D., no matter how much experience (if any) they have as an 
assistant professor. The second concours, is an internal competition that is only open to 
assistant professors who are at least 40 years old and who have at least 10 years 
experience. As only four internal competitions have been organized since 1979 (47 assistant 
professors have been promoted via this method), 67% of promotions to the full professor 
rank have been awarded by external concours d’agrégation, in which promotion decisions 
are mainly based on research achievements.  
In contrast, the decentralized procedure is only open to assistant professors with at least ten 
years experience. As well as publication scores, these promotion decisions take into account 
administrative duties, such as managing departments.  
Because the decentralized procedure is very different from the concours d’agrégation and 
because the concours d’agrégation is the main route to promotion for French business 
studies professors, the present study only examined the external concours d’agrégation.  
In order to evaluate the impact of the promotion procedure on publication scores, it was first 
necessary to determine the probability of being promoted. This probability was then used to 
estimate propensity scores, which was the first step of the evaluation procedure described 
above.  
As can be seen in figure 1, the timetable for the concours d’agrégation is very long (Combes 
et al., 2008). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
4 In other disciplines, the concours d’agrégation does not exist and all promotions are decided by decentralized procedures. 
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Figure 1. 
The timetable for the concours d’agrégation 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
When details of the promotion procedure are announced, potential candidates are told how 
many full professorships are available and the registration deadline. The names of the jury 
members are announced before the registration deadline. The Ministry of Education chooses 
the president of the jury from amongst France’s most experienced full professors in the 
relevant field. Other members are nominated by the President and appointed by the Ministry. 
Jury members are usually well-known researchers, although not all work in the university 
sector, and they may be from France or abroad. Despite being appointed by the Ministry of 
Education, jury members are independent. When candidates register for the concours 
d’agrégation they are not informed where the available full-professor posts are located. 
Between September and May, the jury carries out several interviews (leçons), during which 
they assess the candidates’ research. In May (or June), the jury announces the names of the 
successful candidates and their rankings. The locations of the available positions are then 
revealed, and the successful candidates choose their preferred location according to their 
ranking (i.e., the candidate ranked first can choose from all the available positions, the 
candidate ranked second can choose from the remaining positions and so forth). There are 
three major differences between the French and American promotion procedures. First, in 
France, assistant professors are granted tenure soon after they are hired (university 
professors are civil servants and French civil servants have excellent job security). As a 
result, the main motivation for seeking promotion is not to obtain job security, but to further 
one’s career in terms of salary, duties and mobility. Second, promoted candidates are likely 
to have to move to a different university, as there may not be any positions available in their 
current university, or they may not be ranked high enough to be able to choose their current 
university. Conversely, unsuccessful candidates generally do not leave their university. Third, 
universities cannot choose their full professors (Combes et al., 2008). 
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Dataset 
Fourteen business-studies external concours d’agrégation were held between 1979 and 
2007. The Ministry of Education granted full access to its concours d’agrégation database, 
which contains the names of the candidates and the members of the juries for all 14 
sessions, as well as personal data about the candidates (gender, age, etc.) and information 
about the juries’ decisions. The present study only considered candidates who were assistant 
professors when they applied for promotion, thereby excluding applicants from outside the 
university system. This provided a database of 502 assistant professors who went through 
the promotion procedure to try and become full-professors. Forty-two percent of these 
candidates were successful. 
The name of each candidate’s Ph.D. supervisor and the date the candidate obtained his/her 
Ph.D. were extracted from the SUDOC database and added to the Ministry of Education 
data5. This database also includes the name of the university that awarded the Ph.D. It is 
widely recognized that the prestige of the university awarding a Ph.D. strongly influences 
future career possibilities: professors with Ph.D.s from the best universities obtain the best 
positions and have the best chances of being promoted (Crane, 1965; Long et al., 1979). 
France’s most prestigious university for business studies is the University of Paris 9, which is 
seen as the birthplace of business studies in France. Paris 9 still attracts the best students 
and the best professors. 
The SUDOC data were also used to calculate the lengths of post-Ph.D. careers and the 
professional links between a candidate and members of the jury. By noting whether or not a 
candidate’s Ph.D. supervisor was a member of the jury, it was possible to take into account 
peer-rich effects due to Ph.D. supervisors favoring past students and influencing other 
members of the jury. Combes et al. (2008) showed that networking has a significant and 
positive effect on the promotion prospects of economists teaching in French universities. In 
order to obtain a more complete picture of the influence of former Ph.D. supervisors, a 
further variable was added: whether or not a candidate’s Ph.D. supervisor was a member of 
another jury. This variable can affect decisions in two ways. First, Ph.D. supervisors in 
another jury (before the candidate applies) could inform candidates about promotion criteria 
and competition rules, without giving direct support. Second, as only well-known academics 
are asked to sit on juries, being a member of a jury is an indicator of a Ph.D. supervisor’s 
reputation. 
 
Finally, the average annual publication record of each candidate before and after the 
promotion procedure6 was examined as a proxy for productivity. Hence mean annual 
publication scores were calculated for the periods before and after (up to 2009) the 
promotion procedure. This gives a global indicator, supposing that individual scientific 
production is homogenous in the pre-promotion and in the post-promotion observation 
periods. In order to assess the sensitivity of the results with respect to this hypothesis, four 
indicators of scientific production were examined: the global indicator presented above and 
                                                            
5 For 12 candidates among the 502 observed, no information was found in the SUDOC database. Our sample is 
thus reduced to 490 candidates. 
6 Evaluations were based on publication scores calculated before and after the concours. A second pre-concours 
publication score was also calculated, based on the number of publications published up until one year after the 
concours, in order to take into account the fact that candidates’ CVs include forthcoming publications, which are 
therefore known to the jury (Combes et al., 2008). This measure of publication scores did not have a statistically 
significant effect on the results. 
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three indicators based on publications published two years (for all competitions), four years 
(for competitions held between 1979 and 2005) and six years (for competitions held 
between 1979 and 2003) before and after the promotion procedure. The matching 
estimators showed that the results for the four indicators were similar (Appendix 1). Hence, 
assuming homogenous scientific production over time did not affect the results. 
Three types of publication were recorded: (a) articles in international journals (collated from 
the Econlit and Business Source Premier electronic databases); (b) articles in French 
journals, collated from the author lists for all the abstracts published by the main French 
business studies journals; (c) books, collated from the French National Library’s electronic 
database. All the publication indicators cover the full range of publications. Three indicators 
do not take into account journal-ranking systems; but the fourth indicator calculates 
publication scores on the basis of the number of articles published weighted according to the 
prestige of the journal (using the Science Citation Index). The number of articles and/or 
books published by a candidate before and after the promotion procedure was also weighted 
according to the number of years between the candidate’s Ph.D. and the promotion 
procedure, and according to the number of years between the promotion procedure and 
2009.  
Table 1 summarizes all the variables that were used in the econometric analysis. 
The differences between promoted (“treated” column) and non-promoted professors (“all 
controls” column) suggest that the promotion procedure favors candidates who have more 
rapid careers (that is, they obtain their Ph.D. younger and go through the promotion 
procedure sooner after obtaining their Ph.D.), who obtained their Ph.D. from the University 
of Paris 9, who have published more, and who were assessed by a jury that included their 
Ph.D. supervisor (Table 1). Unlike previous research into academic careers (Ginther and 
Hayes, 1999, 2003), a large gender effect did not emerge.  
These descriptive findings were used to calculate the probability of successfully completing 
the concours d’agrégation and to identify matched controls (see below). The matched 
controls and treated categories have very similar observable characteristics; therefore it was 
possible to evaluate the effect of promotion on productivity (Table 1). 
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TABLE 1 
Pre-treatment characteristics 
 
Variable Treated All controls 
Matched 
controls 
Control variables    
Number of positions/Number of candidates  0.456 0.391 0.449 
Male 0.769 0.756 0.765 
Age when Ph.D. awarded 30.367 32.007 31.009 
Number of years between Ph.D. and the promotion procedure 5.286 7.626 6.578 
Number of previous applications 1.348 1.498 1.314 
Ph.D. from Paris 9 0.176 0.121 0.151 
Ph.D. supervisor on the jury 0.111 0.022 0.019 
Ph.D. supervisor on another jury 0.211 0.198 0.207 
Publication scores before the promotion procedure 4.678 0.564 4.393 
Publication differential before and after the promotion procedure       
Total differential  -0.290 -0.194 -0.179 
Differential for international journals -0.016 -0.010 0.012 
Differential for French journals -0.035 -0.177 -0.002 
Differential for books -1.226 -0.269 -0.0479 
Differential for quality-weighted publications -0.289 -0.007 -0.179 
No. of observations 199 291 251 
Notes: Matched controls are individuals who belong to the control sample, based on the propensity score 
estimate shown in Table 2.  
 
Table 1 also presents publication differentials before and after the promotion procedure for 
all the candidates. Annual productivity scores were lower after the concours for all types of 
publication. However, this differential was greater for the treated group than for the control 
group (-0.290 and –0.194, respectively). 
These descriptive statistics suggest that productivity decreases after promotion; however, 
such simplistic observations may be biased because promoted and non-promoted candidates 
have different profiles.  
 
 
IV- The effect of promotion on productivity scores: matching estimates 
 
Results  
 
In order to correct for selectivity bias, kernel-matching methods (see section II) were used 
to estimate counterfactual publication scores for the promoted and non-promoted 
candidates. These scores were then used to determine unbiased productivity differentials. 
The results of the two steps of the analysis - the calculation of propensity scores (the 
probability of achieving promotion via the concours) and the calculation of publication 
differentials using kernel-matching methods - are presented below. In order to analyze the 
results in more detail, two different sub-groups, based on gender, were examined in addition 
to the full sample. 
Table 2 presents the results of the first step. 
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TABLE 2 
Probability of being promoted – propensity scores 
 
 Full sample Male Female 
  Coef. Standard 
error 
Coef. Standard 
error 
Coef. Standard 
error 
Number of positions/Number of candidates  2.240 0.434*** 2.409 0.493*** 2.259 0.993** 
Male 0.060 0.158ns     
Age when Ph.D. awarded -0.076 0.015*** -0.096 0.018*** -0.031 0.035ns 
No. of years between Ph.D. and the promotion 
procedure -0.140 0.020*** -0.157 0.023*** -0.105 0.051** 
Number of previous applications -0.086 0.112ns -0.084 0.125ns -0.116 0.293ns 
Ph.D. from Paris 9 0.191 0.186ns 0.189 0.231ns 0.342 0.334ns 
Ph.D. supervisor in the jury 1.272 0.336*** 1.369 0.384*** 1.327 0.784* 
Ph.D. supervisor in another jury 0.090 0.162ns 0.024 0.190ns 0.254 0.336ns 
Publication scores before 0.100 0.019*** 0.078 0.021*** 0.262 0.063*** 
Constant 1.700 0.552*** 2.532 0.657*** -0.559 1.197ns 
Log Likelihood -244.051 -182.750 -58.941 
No. of observations 450 345 105 
Notes: ***: significant at 1%, **: significant at 5%, *: significant at 10% and ns: non significant 
 
 
In terms of the results for the control variables, the coefficient for the number of 
positions/number of candidates ratio is significantly positive, indicating that less competition 
means a higher probability of success. The results also show that youth is an advantage, as 
candidates who obtained their Ph.D. at a young age and candidates who applied for 
promotion soon after obtaining their Ph.D. had a greater chance of being promoted. In line 
with Combes et al. (2008), significant effects were found for past productivity and network 
connections. In the case of network connections, the probability of being promoted appears 
to be higher for a candidate whose Ph.D. supervisor was on the jury, but this was not the 
case if the supervisor was a member of another jury. Hence, peer-rich effects seem to be 
more important than information or reputation effects. In addition, despite its reputation, a 
Ph.D. from the University of Paris 9 had no effect on the probability of being promoted. It is 
also interesting that there was no significant effect of gender, which is in marked contrast to 
other studies of promotion in academia (Ginther and Hayes, 1999, 2003; Long et al., 1993). 
In fact, the problem facing females in French academia seems to be more of a “sticky floor” 
than a “glass ceiling”, as females are severely under-represented among candidates for 
promotion, although they have the same success rate as men when they do apply. A non-
significant effect of gender has also been reported for the field of economics (Combes et al., 
2008).  
Similar results were obtained for most of the sub-samples. These results were used to 
estimate propensity scores. These scores allow us to match “equivalent” treated and non-
treated7. The candidates were divided into five homogenous blocks. As each of these blocks 
has a valid balancing hypothesis (that is the average propensity score of treated and 
matched controls does not differ), the publication scores of non-promoted candidates could 
                                                            
7 Among the 291 controls, 40 individuals have very different observed characteristics (especially in terms of age) from those of 
the promoted persons. These outliers thus have been excluded from the analysis. 
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be used to estimate counterfactual propensity scores for promoted candidates (and vice 
versa). Kernel matching was used to estimate the unbiased differentials in publication scores 
before and after the concours d’agrégation for both successful and unsuccessful candidates.  
The results of these estimates are shown in Table 3. Publication differentials were estimated 
for promoted and non-promoted candidates for all publications (column 1), for articles in 
international journals (column 2), for articles in French journals (column 3) and for books 
(column 4). The impact of promotions on publication scores was estimated for the full 
sample and for the four sub-samples. 
 
TABLE 3 
Publication-score differentials before and after promotion 
 
 (1)  
Total 
differential 
(2) 
Differential for 
international 
journals 
(3)  
Differential for 
French journals 
(4) 
Differential 
for books 
(5) 
Differential for 
quality 
weighted 
publications 
Promoted candidates 
   Full sample 0.210 
(0.179)ns 
-0.008 
(0.150)ns 
0.177 
(0.089)** 
-0.429 
(0.694)ns 
0.052 
(0.110)ns 
   Male 0.243 
(0.213)ns 
-0.029 
(0.157)ns 
0.192 
(0.118)ns 
-0.668 
(0.759)ns 
0.070 
(0.120)ns 
   Female 0.132 
(0.221)ns 
0.216 
(0.179)ns 
0.104 
(0.144)ns 
0.360 
(0.638)ns 
0.041 
(0.102)ns 
Non-promoted candidates 
   Full sample -0.229 
(0.101)** 
-0.020 
(0.037)ns 
-0.141 
(0.064)** 
-0.430 
(0.612)ns 
-0.133 
(0.056)*** 
   Male 0.242 
(0.199)ns 
0.030 
(0.150)ns 
0.198 
(0.117)ns 
-0.679 
(0.723)ns 
-0.103 
(0.090) ns 
   Female -0.328 
(0.148)** 
-0.033 
(0.049)ns 
-0.247 
(0.111)** 
0.345 
(0.597)ns 
-0.099 
(0.106)ns 
Notes 1: Bootstrapped standard errors (obtained after 1,000 replications) are given in brackets. 
Notes 2: ***: significant at 1%, **: significant at 5%, *: significant at 10% and ns: non significant 
 
The results presented in table 3 suggest that being promoted does not lead to a substantial 
decline in publication score. Most of the results for the promoted candidates were not 
significant. Exceptions to this rule are articles in French journals for the full sample, for which 
the estimated differential was positive.  
Kernel-matching estimates for candidates who were denied promotion gave negative 
differentials; that is to say, candidates denied promotion published significantly less after the 
promotion procedure. This result is most apparent for females, for articles in French journals, 
and for the publication of books by the most recent cohorts.  
 
These results clearly contradict the predictions of agency theory and of Lazaer (2004), as 
publication scores did not decrease for promoted candidates, but they did decrease for 
candidates who were denied promotion.  
In fact, all the explanatory factors for the fall of productivity after promotion suppose that 
incentives disappear following promotion. This seems to be incorrect in the case of French 
 -15- 
academia for two main reasons. First, any reduction in extrinsic incentives for French 
academics is likely to be minimized by the fact that most newly promoted full professors 
have to move to a new university. As a result, they have to join a new research department, 
develop new contacts and build a reputation. The resulting peer pressure may limit free-rider 
behavior and maintain overall productivity. In addition, because successful candidates 
choose their preferred location according to their ranking, the lowest ranked professors may 
be required to go universities they would not otherwise have chosen. Full professors who are 
unhappy with their posting can subsequently apply for a transfer. Such transfers are more 
likely to be accorded to professors with good publication scores, thereby providing another 
incentive to be productive. 
Second, although there is less of a decrease in extrinsic motivation for promoted professors 
in France, intrinsic motivations remain unchanged following promotion. If professors are 
motivated workers (Besley and Ghatak 2005), they will be relatively insensitive to promotion 
and they are likely to continue publishing at the same rate. This is reinforced by the fact 
that, in France, assistant professors and full professors often have similar roles. 
Consequently, most of the skills required to obtain promotion from the assistant professor 
rank are the same as the skills required to successfully carry out the role of full professor. 
The decrease in productivity recorded for assistant professors who are denied promotion 
may be due to the fact that the concours is the main route to promotion. As failure at the 
promotion procedure can be viewed as the end of any likelihood of promotion, being denied 
promotion may lead to a major decrease in motivation and therefore to a lower publication 
score. This effect may be reinforced by the facts that assistant professors in France are civil 
servants with guaranteed job security and that low productivity will not result in sanctions. In 
addition, unsuccessful candidates for the concours d’agrégation who decide to try and obtain 
promotion through the decentralized procedure (direct negotiations with universities) are 
likely to focus on administrative duties, as such tasks are a major promotion criterion in this 
procedure. As administrative duties are highly time-consuming, they tend to substantially 
reduce publication scores.  
 
In summary, the results do not show any change in publication scores for French business 
studies professors who are promoted to full professor rank via the concours d’agrégation; 
therefore, there is no evidence for a decline in productivity after promotion. However, 58% 
of candidates for promotion are unsuccessful and this failure leads to a significant reduction 
in productivity, suggesting that the promotion procedure may have deleterious effects.  
 
 
Results of the sensitivity analysis 
 
A sensitivity analysis was carried out to determine the robustness of the matching estimates 
when the CIA is not satisfied; that is to say, when the probability of being promoted is not 
random within each cell defined by the observables, x . This would occur if there were 
differences between promoted and non-promoted professors in terms of unobservable 
abilities. Consequently, it is essential to test the reliability of the CIA. This was done using 
the method developed by Ichino et al. (2008). A summary of the reasoning on which this 
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sensitivity analysis is founded is presented below (based on Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983, 
Rosenbaum, 1987 and Imbens, 2003).  
If the CIA is not satisfied given x , but is satisfied when it includes an additional binary 
confounding factor, U , which measures an unobservable ability component, then: 
[ ] [ ]xCPExCPE ,0/,1/ 00 =!=  , but: [ ] [ ]UxCPEUxCPE ,,0/,,1/ 00 === . 
Following Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), the distribution of U  is fully specified by the choice 
of four parameters, given by: 
( )( ) ( )( )xjpPIiCUjpPIiCUsij ,*,/1Pr*,/1Pr =>====>===    (4) 
with { }1,0, !ji  and where I  is the indicator function and *p  is the median of the 
distribution of the publication scores, P 8. 
 
The parameters ijs  give the probability that 1=U  in each of the four groups defined by 
promotion status and outcomes. For example, if people for whom 1=U  are denoted skilled 
people, 11s  can be defined as the fraction of skilled candidates among those who are 
promoted )1( =C  and who publish more than the median. 
Once a distribution for U  has been chosen, U  can be simulated in the data. The first step is 
to define the values of the parameters (Ichino et al., 2008), ijs . This can be accomplished in 
two different ways: (1) Values for each ijs  can be arbitrarily chosen, for example: 
5.000011011 ==== ssss , which defines a neutral confounder. (2) U  can be calibrated to 
mimic important observable covariates. For example, suppose that the distribution of U  is 
similar to the distribution of gender. The academic promotions dataset shows that 79% of 
the individuals who are promoted and who have a higher publication score than the median 
are male. Hence, s11 is set at 0.79, that is to say 79% of people in the sample are skilled and 
have 1=U . Finally, it is implicitly assumed that promoted candidates are more “skilled” than 
the controls (non-promoted candidates). 
Both techniques enable a value of U  to be attributed to each individual, according to which 
of the four defined groups that person belongs. The simulated U  is then used as an 
additional covariate to estimate new propensity scores and kernel matching estimates9. A 
comparison of the estimates obtained with and without the additional variable indicates the 
extent to which the initial results are robust to this particular failure of the CIA.  
 
Table 4 presents the results of this sensitivity analysis for the global differential in publication 
scores10 for (a) promoted candidates and (b) non-promoted candidates.  
In table 4a, each row of the first four columns gives the four probabilities, ijs , which define 
the distribution of the unobservable abilities components, U , by promotion status and 
outcome. Column 5 gives the outcome effect of U , by estimating a logit model of 
                                                            
8 As outcomes are a continuous variable, a binary transformation of P  was used to define the parameters ijs  
(Nannicini, 2007). Tests using other values for *p  (mean, 25th and 75th centiles) showed that the results of the 
sensitivity analysis were not affected by this choice. 
9 See Ichino et al. (2008) for details on computing standard errors of the simulated kernel matching estimates. 
10 The results of the sensitivity analysis for detailed types of publications are not presented here but are available 
upon request. The CIA was found to be plausible for all types of publications. 
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( )xUCjI ,,0/Pr == , with { }1,0∈j . This outcome effect, noted ! , measures the effect of 
skill on the outcome for non-promoted candidates, after controlling for observables, x .  
Similarly, column 6 presents the selection effect of U , noted ! , by estimating a logit model 
of ( )xUiC ,/Pr = , with { }1,0∈i . Λ  measures the impact of U  on the probability of being 
promoted (taking into account covariates x ). Table 4b has a similar format to Table 4a. 
The first row of Table 4a indicates the initial matching estimate of the global publication 
differential before and after promotion. The second row gives the simulated matching 
estimate using a neutral confounder. The other rows present simulated estimates in which 
U  is calibrated to match the distribution of specific covariates. 
 
TABLE 4 
Sensitivity analysis 
 
a) Promoted candidates 
 
  
Fraction of 1=U  by promotion 
status and outcome 
Outcome 
effect 
(! ) 
 
Selection 
effect 
(! ) 
 
Matching 
estimator 
 
Standard 
error 
 
11s  10s  01s  00s  
Baseline matching estimator 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 - - 0.210 0.179ns 
Neutral confounder 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 1.33 1.05 0.208 0.185ns 
Confounder-like:         
Male 0.79 0.77 0.78 0.74 1.39 1.24 0.207 0.183ns 
Ph.D. from Paris 9 0.19 0.15 0.13 0.15 1.09 1.59 0.206 0.179ns 
Ph.D. supervisor on the jury 0.74 0.67 0.73 0.83 0.77 0.62 0.203 0.173ns 
Ph.D. supervisor on another jury 0.23 0.20 0.20 0.17 1.26 1.15 0.210 0.123ns 
 
b) Non-promoted candidates 
 
  
Fraction of  by promotion 
status and outcome 
Outcome 
effect 
(! ) 
 
Selection 
effect 
(! ) 
 
Matching 
estimator 
 
Standard 
error 
     
Baseline matching estimator 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 - - -0.229 0.101** 
Neutral confounder 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 1.29 0.96 -0.233 0.102** 
Confounder-like:         
Male 0.77 0.74 0.80 0.75 1.31 0.88 -0.227 0.091** 
Ph.D. from Paris 9 0.13 0.13 0.19 0.14 1.35 0.70 -0.230 0.099** 
Ph.D. supervisor on the jury 0.76 0.80 0.67 0.69 1.31 1.85 -0.234 0.101** 
Ph.D. supervisor on another jury 0.20 0.19 0.23 0.20 1.30 0.94 -0.233 0.100** 
Notes 1: U defines a binary confounding factor, which is not observed and ijs denotes the fraction of 1=U , by 
promotion status and publication score. On the basis of these parameters, a value of U  was simulated and used 
to estimate a kernel-matching estimator (after 1,000 repetitions). 
Notes 2: ***: significant at 1%, **: significant at 5%, *: significant at 10% and ns: non significant 
 
The results of the sensitivity analysis for promoted candidates (table 4a) when the 
distribution of U  is comparable to the gender distribution are examined below. After 
controlling for observable covariates, skills were found to increase the publication scores for 
non-promoted candidates ( 139.1 >=Γ ) and the probability of being promoted 
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( 124.1 >=Λ ). If the CIA is not satisfied when it is attributed these characteristics, the 
matching estimator is equal to 0.207. This indicates that the potential confounder U  
behaves like the gender dummy. It explains only 1.43%11 of the baseline estimate and 
remains statistically non-significant. Similarly, when the distribution of U  is assumed to 
mimic the distribution of other observable binary covariates, all these variables were found 
to affect the outcome and the selection effects. However, for the promoted candidates, the 
simulated matching estimator was always very close to the baseline estimate and always 
non-significant. 
Similarly, the results of the sensitivity analysis for the non-promoted candidates (table 6b) 
indicate that the simulated matching estimators do not strongly differ from the baseline 
estimates and remain statistically negative, whatever the type of distribution chosen for U . 
All these simulations support the robustness of the matching estimates, whatever the 
distribution chosen for U. Although unobservable abilities influence the outcome and 
selection effect, they do not seem to affect the estimate of the publication-score differentials 
before and after promotion.  
 
 
IV- Conclusion 
 
The present research represents the first attempt to empirically test whether or not the 
productivity of French university professors decreases when they are promoted from 
assistant professor to full professor. According to the principal-agent framework, being 
promoted would be expected to lead to a decrease in productivity and failure to obtain 
promotion would be expected to lead to an increase in productivity. An original and rich 
dataset was constructed in order to test these predictions for business-studies professors 
who were promoted or denied promotion via the concours d’agrégation, which is the main 
procedure for promoting university professors in this field in France. This dataset was used 
to compare the publication scores of promoted professors with counterfactual publication 
scores; that is to say, with the publication scores they would have had if they had not been 
promoted. As counterfactual productivity cannot be observed, this evaluation had to 
overcome the problem of selectivity bias, which was done by applying kernel-matching 
methods. The results clearly contradict the predictions of the principal-agent theory, as 
promotion from assistant professor to full professor was found to have no significant effect 
on publication scores. Conversely, failure to achieve promotion seems to lead to a marked 
decline in productivity. A sensitivity analysis (carried out according to the method described 
by Ichino et al., 2008) supported the robustness of the matching estimates, whatever the 
distribution chosen for U. 
The results show that promotion to full professor rank does not lead to a fall in productivity 
for promoted professors. This may be due partly to new extrinsic incentives arising after 
promotion; however, the main cause is probably the maintenance of intrinsic motivation. 
Nevertheless, the results show a slight decrease in publication scores for non-promoted 
professors.  
                                                            
11 ( )
210.0
207.0210.0 −  
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Appendix A 
Publication score differentials before and after the “concours d’aggrégation” 
Total Differential (1)  
Global 
Indicator 
(1)  
Two-year 
indicator 
(1)  
Four-year 
indicator 
(1)  
Six-year 
indicator 
Promoted candidates 
   Full sample 0.210 
(0.179)ns 
0.189 
(0.127)ns 
0.191 
(0.132)ns 
0.206 
(0.165)ns 
Non-promoted candidates 
   Full sample -0.229 
(0.101)** 
-0.196 
(0.091)** 
-0.204 
(0.099)** 
-0.215 
(0.102)** 
Notes 1: Bootstrapped standard errors (obtained after 1,000 replications) are given in brackets. 
Notes 2: ***: significant at 1%, **: significant at 5%, *: significant at 10% and ns: non significant 
